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Abstract 
Critical infrastructure (CI) refers to assets that are essential for the functioning of a society 
and economy, such as telecommunication/ICT; energy generation, transmission and 
distribution; financial sector; etc. CIs are tightly coupled, creating a complex system where 
failures propagate from a disrupted CI to other CIs, aggravating and prolonging the societal 
impact through cascading effects. This thesis extends a system dynamic model by Eliza 
Canzani describing how a failed critical infrastructure that cannot deliver products and 
services impacts other critical infrastructures, and how a critical infrastructure is affected 
when another critical infrastructure fails. The model is simply enough to influence mental 
models of crisis managers. It provides a high-level view of the dynamics of disruptive events 
in CIs, facilitating understanding scenarios of disruptions and forecasting cascading effects, 
hopefully aiding strategic planning for protection of CIs. 
 
Key words: Critical infrastructures, interdependencies, system dynamics modelling, 
epidemics modelling. 
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1 Introduction 
The overall aim of the thesis is to develop a system dynamics model that simulates the 
cascading effects in critical infrastructures (CI) when a disruption in any CI occurs. For 
example, from the Information and communications technology (ICT) perspective it is of 
importance to maintain an ICT -infrastructure that is secure and durable in the event of a 
disruption; this is also applicable to other CI that are dependent on ICT for their daily 
operations. On the other hand, the ICT-infrastructure can be affected if, e.g., the energy CI is 
disrupted. All CIs are interdependent. The proposed thesis model will be used to simulate 
various scenarios where a disruption to one or more CI affects interdependent CIs through 
cascading effects.  
The starting hypothesis is that the model proposed by (Canzani, 2016) is not appropriate to 
represent the disrupting cascade-effects in critical infrastructures. Her work as a graduate 
student of the Universität der Bundeswehr München proposes a different and interesting 
approach to CI behaviour and is a valuable contribution which has led to this thesis. However, 
an in-depth study of Canzani’s model shows that it is not ideal to use to simulate cascading 
effects after disruptions to CI. Her adaptation of an epidemics model (SIRS) to simulate the 
cascading effects of disruptions is not appropriate because a central element in any epidemic 
is missing when a CI is disrupted: the transmission of infections, does not occur when critical 
infrastructures are disrupted, whether directly or through cascading effects. The parameters 
that express the effects CI have on each other that are considered down for a certain amount 
of time, are also misinterpreted. Furthermore, Canzani’s model has not been tested following 
best practice in system dynamics and, thus, it has not documented credibility.   
Based on these weaknesses, the following problem statements have been developed:  
1. Can Canzani’s model be improved to represent critical infrastructure behaviour? 
 
2. Will the data from the thesis survey provide significantly differing results from the 
survey data used in Canzani’s scenarios? 
To test the hypothesis and answer the problem statements, the thesis work was divided into 
four sub-goals. The first goal was to replicate the model created by Canzani and to be able to 
produce the same results. Replication is a crucial part of scientific research (Jasny et al. 2011) 
but replication studies in social and management sciences were rarely done (Sterman, 2000) 
and probably they are still rare. The first step to achieve an accurate replication was a 
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literature study of how system dynamics operate within the confined space of critical 
infrastructure. Replicating Canzani’s model required using the same mathematical equations 
and parameters, making the literature study of vital importance. The second step was to 
analyse Canzani’s model and assess how well it reflects system dynamic behaviour. During 
the assessment, the aim was to discover how it could be improved or changed to more 
accurately reflect the behaviour in critical infrastructures, according to how system dynamics 
operate. This lead to the second goal, which was to create the thesis model that could run the 
same and new simulations, which would answer the problem statements and establish the 
hypothesis as right or wrong. The third goal was to create a survey which would be 
distributed to leading experts in critical infrastructures in Norway to assess the service 
provided by critical infrastructures in the event of cascading disruptions over time. These 
results would then be used in simulating disruption scenarios in Norway using the thesis 
model. Lastly the fourth goal was to create a worst-case scenario where disruption causing 
maximum destruction across all networked CI could be simulated with the thesis model. 
The motivation for researching this topic and achieving these goals stems from a desire to 
understand how systems dynamics modelling works and how the models behave during 
disruptive events. Because ICT is a wide field of study and important to society as an integral 
part in numerous aspects, it is a topic which can be evaluated from many different 
perspectives. Prior to the thesis work, the perspective has been the details about how various 
ICT devices and infrastructure operate. This increased the understanding of individual units 
and devices work but has not shown how they all behave together as a system where 
interdependencies are present. To model these interdependencies of CI using system 
dynamics modelling required a deeper understanding of mathematics and learning how to use 
modelling tools, such as Vensim DSS. This thesis presents a new approach and a valuable 
learning opportunity in system dynamics and modelling. The thesis work as such is 
considered a new area of study and work, which generated the motivation to further explore 
it.  
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1.1 Model development  
The thesis model was developed using Vensim DSS modelling software (Ventana Systems, 
2016) in iterative stages, based upon the model created by Canzani (2016). The review of 
Canzani’s methods and model was used as starting point for designing and developing the 
thesis model. The thesis model structure was evaluated during each iterative stage and 
compared with results from previous iterations. Furthermore, it was sent to the thesis 
supervisor for feedback. 
1.2 Thesis limitations 
In replicating Canzani’s model, the greatest limitation was the lack of access to her model. 
The reproduced thesis model is therefore based on the description, article graphics and the 
simulation results only. This limits the evaluation and ability to compare the results with 
exactness and creates a dimension of uncertainty. The thesis model had limited peer review 
during the creation process. An increased number of peer reviews could potentially have 
yielded a more accurate model. Another limitation is that the thesis survey sent to experts 
gave very few responses from the recipients, causing the simulated scenarios to not be a 
realistic representation for Norway’s critical infrastructures. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter one of this thesis presents the topic, its background, the introduction of the study and 
how the thesis is built to support the hypothesis and problem statements. Chapter two presents 
the theory behind the main elements and the concepts related to the model and the topic of 
study. Chapter three describes the methods used in to evaluate Canzani’s model, the 
development of the thesis model, survey and worst-case scenario. Chapter four consists of the 
thesis model in detail. Chapter five features the various testing done with the thesis model. 
Chapter six contains the results from the simulated scenarios. Chapter seven is a discussion of 
the results and whether the problem statements have been answered and the hypotheses 
confirmed or disproven. Chapter eight is a summary of the thesis work and it also entails 
possible future work available. Chapter nine is a reference section, containing a list of 
references used throughout the thesis. Following these are the appendices. 
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2 Theory 
2.1 System dynamics 
 
The system dynamics concept was developed by Jay Forrester (1961) to describe why an 
employment cycle was unstable in a company he worked for. By developing system 
dynamics, he was able to explain the underlying cause of the instability. This sparked the 
development of system dynamics and since then been further developed by many scholars, 
such as the works of John Sterman (2000) and Forrester himself (et al. 1968) which attempt to 
further explain and develop system dynamics and provides a deep explanation on how to 
apply them to a variety of modern-day scenarios. Sterman’s book, Business Dynamics (2000), 
is the most recent applicable book due to its comprehensiveness of system dynamics and has 
been referenced frequently by various disciplines of study, such as a study and simulation of 
US infrastructure interdependencies (Hyeung-Sik J. Min et al. 2007).   
System dynamics can be overall described as a system of nonlinear differential equations 
which attempt to explain a systems behaviour. The four main elements are feedback, stocks 
and flows and time delays. The usage of stock-and-flow diagrams and feedback loops are the 
central elements used in the methodology of system dynamics. The stock and flow diagrams 
refer to stocks or levels which are accumulations in the system and flows which are 
effectively rates entering or leaving the stocks. In a Vensim model file, these each have their 
own graphical representation as shown in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The stock (box) represents a level that is affected by some flow(arrow) and an 
initial stock value variable. The flow could be either outgoing or inbound, depending on if the 
stock is increasing or decreasing its level. In this case it is inbound. 
Each stock is mathematically represented with differential equations. The flows, either in or 
out are factors that influence the equations. The same applies to any other variable or constant 
that affects the flow or stock. In Figure 1, the Stock can be mathematically represented as 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤. Modelling system behaviour requires some prior 
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knowledge to how the system works, to identify the key structures, i.e. stocks and flows. The 
importance of them appears most clearly when seen in a continuous view. As much as 
discrete timed events are possible to simulate, the continuous view looks for underlying 
dynamic patterns (System Dynamics Society , 2018). Topics that can be evaluated with 
system dynamics modelling can be human behaviour in a dynamic environment, such as an 
attempt at modelling human behaviour in airline queues (Canzani et al. 2014). or modelling 
accumulated debris in Low-Earth Orbit. (Drmola et. al 2018). Important studies that have 
used system dynamics modelling and techniques are environmental case studies, (Beall et al. 
2009), project management modelling (Ford, et al 2007), group model building (Andersen et 
al. 2007) and modelling improvement processes (Repenning et al. 2001). These studies show 
that system dynamics can be applied to a variety of sciences and cases. Recent studies and 
work related to the thesis specifically are for instance the research of critical infrastructure 
interdependencies (Conrad et al. 2006) and implementation of system dynamics in a block-
by-block concept (Canzani, 2016). Understanding system dynamics requires the user to 
interact with system components on a mathematical level to build models which can represent 
system behaviour. Because systems can be complex in both their appearance and function, 
building models that represent these can provide a simple, abstract figure in which the 
complex can be simplified and understood more easily for the user.  
2.2 Critical Infrastructure 
There is no set definition of a critical infrastructure (CI). This is because it is an evolving 
term as new infrastructure definitions emerge and are added to our society, such as the rapid 
development of ICT. This has since become a solid backbone infrastructure many other CIs 
depend on. Similarly, after events such as the 9/11-event in the US, there were added more 
CIs to the list (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013) which previously 
were not recognised as such. The concept refers to a part of society where the output is 
considered essential for day-to-day functions, and by some is defined as a lifeline-system 
(O'Rourke, 2007). The EU council as recently as in 2008 defined a CI as “an asset, system or 
part thereof located in member states which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal 
functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption 
or destruction of which would have a significant impact on a member state as a result of the 
failure to maintain those functions.” (The Council of the European Union, 2008).  
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Because of their importance in society, it is imperative to be able to prepare for events which 
cause them to behave differently than their prescribed day-to-day functions. The simulation of 
CI behaviour has proved to be difficult for several reasons. These reasons are in most cases 
the availability of information regarding the infrastructure(s), their changing states, 
regulations and complexity. Considering that an infrastructure performs several functions, it 
was decided to aggregate these functions into overall definitions, such as “Water” or 
“Electricity”. This was done to primarily reduce model complexity. In the context of this 
work, the CI functions have been aggregated into Water, Transport, Energy, Financial and 
ICT CI, respectively.  
2.3 CI interdependencies 
Critical infrastructures are interconnected systems, which means they have interdependencies 
between themselves. Because of these interdependencies, it is inferred that should an event 
happen that incapacitates or reduces one infrastructure, this might cause the interdependent 
systems to suffer in various levels as well.  Rinaldi suggests 4 distinct levels of 
interdependencies; geographical, cyber, logical and physical. Geographical refers to local 
events creating state changes in all CIs. Cyber interdependencies occur when systems are 
connected via information infrastructure and their state is regulated accordingly. Physical 
interdependency is when infrastructure states depend on the material output of each CI. 
Logical interdependency is when the states of each is regulated by some other means or 
mechanism that is not cyber, geographical or physical (Rinaldi, 2004). 
Social studies suggest ICT (if defined as the Internet) is more important than other CI’s 
because of its “indispensability” in the current society (Tosuna et al. 2011). ICT however 
depends on all the CI in this project to function properly. Examples of interdependencies 
could be an online bank service being disabled due to a power outage, a water plant is 
unreachable because of faulty communication lines or ICT systems not functioning due to not 
receiving proper water cooling. These are basic examples which show that due to 
interdependencies it is crucial for managers and system administrators to understand how 
they are connected and model their policies and strategies accordingly. When they do, they 
can prepare more effectively for events that may occur. Because there are numerous ways CIs 
are connected however, modelling this is a somewhat limited approach. It is acknowledged 
that models that attempt to describe CI interdependencies during disruptions are always false 
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because they cannot contain every detail. They are however an attempt at finding the best 
possible representation of reality.  
Considering recent catastrophic events from reality which have had a cascading effect is the 
ransomware ‘WannaCry’. The cascading effects of the ransomware on the NHS (National 
Health Service) in the UK in May 2017 from the cyberattack were ‘thousands of 
appointments and operations were cancelled’ to mention a few (National Audit Office , 
2017). Another event is the flooding which occurred in the southern region of Norway in 
October 2017. Among the cascading effects (in relation to the previously mentioned 
infrastructures) were electricity outings for industry buildings, rendering them unable to 
perform their work as normal and major transportation issues. A select number of recent 
studies in interdependencies include hybrid systems modelling (Heracleous, et al. 2017) 
where finite state machines are used to model CI and their interdependencies’ behaviour and 
a cascading failure after a terrorist attack is modelled. (Wu, et al. 2016) 
2.4 Epidemics modelling  
The SIRS-model, short for Susceptible, Infected, Recovering and a return to the Susceptible 
state, is an epidemic-type model developed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). The model 
is expressly built with a purpose to show the relationship between the three states S 
(Susceptible), I (Infected), and R (Recovered) that people are in during a disease epidemic. 
The states are functions over time t, where the functions are described in sets of differential 
equations. The Susceptible state are the people which are not infected but have the potential 
to become infected. The Infected are people which have been infected and can transmit the 
disease to the Susceptible group. The Recovered group are people which have been exposed 
the disease and have recovered (i.e. become immune) and cannot transmit or receive the 
disease for some time, then becomes Susceptible again.  
For the model to be considered appropriate for epidemic modelling there must be an infection 
which occurs when the susceptible people interact with the infected, which in turn causes 
more people to get infected. Table 1 shows the differential equations for the three states and 
describes with rates how they are reduced or increased. Based on the equations it becomes 
clear that Susceptible state reduction with rate α is connected to the increase in the Infected 
state, which in turn is reduced by rate β and so on. 
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Table 1. The base differential equations used to express the three states, adapted from (W. O. 
Kermack et al. 1927 p. 713) 
Susceptible 
state 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑆 =  −𝛼𝐼𝑆 +  𝛾𝑅 , where α is a positive 
infection-constant, determining the rate of 
which an individual can transfer into the 
Infected state.  
Infected state 𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐼 =  𝛼𝐼𝑆 − 𝛽𝐼,  where β is a positive 
constant, determining the rate of which an 
infected individual can transfer into the 
Recovered state. 
Recovery state 𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑅 =  𝛽𝐼 −  𝛾𝑅, where γ is the rate of 
which some individual leaves the 
Recovering state and returns to the 
Susceptible state. 
S+I+R  Total number of the population 
 
2.4.1 SIRS-model adaptation and review 
Canzani’s model which forms the basis of this thesis was created to describe the cascading 
effects in networked critical infrastructures following a disruption. This segment is necessary 
because many of the same structures and mathematical equations are used in the thesis model. 
The different states in the SIRS-structure have been repurposed to fit the networked critical 
infrastructures. The three states Susceptible, Infected and Recovering are redefined as 
Running operations, Down operations and Recovering operations-stocks, respectively. The 
sum of these stocks now equals the total number of operations the respective CI can perform 
at any one time. This contrasts with the total number of the population as listed in the SIRS-
model. The disruption that occurs to a CI at time t has been modelled as the introduction of an 
“infection” (but, importantly, such “infection” does not propagate analogously as in an 
epidemic, where infected people transmit the infection to susceptible people). When 
interconnected, each CI is considered a block which becomes part of an array with dimension 
n, where n is the total number of CIs. The disruption is considered the first block. The CI, no 
matter how many there are, are each represented as block number two. These are 
interconnected by a third block, called Services Provided. Each CI-block has an index n and 
   
9 
 
is connected to each other through the services-provided block. The cascading effect occurs 
when the services provided in a CI j, is reduced. The services provided represent the cascade 
into the networked infrastructure i.  
Figure 2. Overview of Canzani’s model structure. It contains stocks, flows and variables that 
aim to simulate cascading effects in networked CI (2016, p. 7). 
Figure 2 illustrates the interconnected blocks and begins with the disruption, as block one, 
which is connected to infrastructure j which performs at some service level which is affected 
by the disruption. This service level disruption cascades into the other infrastructure i which 
can be however many other CI which are connected. In Canzani’s work the number of these 
infrastructure-blocks (Block 2) are 5, indicating the 5 CI Water, Financial, Transport, ICT and 
Energy CI. The disruption block contains the function d(t) which is modelled as a factor md = 
“disruption magnitude” multiplied by a pulse function, named “Disruption”. The pulse sends 
at disruption time td a value of 1, lasting for a disruption duration of ∆Td. Hence, the 
disruption is modelled as d(t) = md × PULSE (td, ∆Td). The disruption is considered an 
additive term to the breakdown rate −𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
) 
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 Table 2. The differential equations in Canzani’s model, adapted from the SIRS-model. 
 
Table 2 depicts the repurposed differential equations used in block 2 and consecutive blocks 
for each CI. The breakdown rate (flow) α is affected by the ratio between the Running 
operations and maximum number of operations that the CI can perform at any given time. 
The behaviour based on the equations, compared to the SIRS-model equations listed in Table 
1 indicates that similar results could be expected because the equations can be considered a 
direct mapping. However, there are assumptions made that the rates γ and β are constant 
average rates; a ratio of average repair time and a ratio of the restore time. This means that the 
disruption occurring at time t does not happen at any other state of operations than when 
operations are running. This leaves out what can happen during the repairs and sequentially 
the recovering of the operations.  
Furthermore, there is an assumption made that when a CI is recovering, there is no chance of 
a disruption happening at that stage. In the SIRS model a person which has been infected and 
recovered, may have some type of immunity before he becomes susceptible again. In terms of 
critical infrastructures, a disruption can happen at any time, even during a recovery process.  
Because there is no protection against this for networked CI’s, the usage of the SIRS model in 
this case is conceptually wrong. From the epidemic point of view, the susceptible people 
mingle with the infected and this creates the epidemic. In Canzani’s model the epidemic 
effect does not in occur because the Running and Down operations do not “mingle”. In the 
SIRS model, the Infected and Susceptible people mingle and propagate the epidemic. The 
epidemic is modelled as a disruption that causes the stock level of Running Operations to 
Running 
operations 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) =  −𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
)
+ 𝛾𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐(𝑡) 
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) = 
Running 
operations 
𝑛𝑂𝑃 = Total 
number of CI 
operations 
Down 
operations 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) =  𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
)
− 𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) 
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) = 
Down operations 
Recovering 
operations  
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) =  𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡)
− 𝛾𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐(𝑡) 
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) = 
Recovering 
operations 
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decrease. The disruption only occurs at this state whereas an infection can happen during 
recovery, or when down even. This shows that the usage of the SIRS model to describe 
cascading events in networked critical infrastructures is not appropriate. For the third block, 
services provided, a new function has been created to represent this and the create a type of 
cascade into the other CIs.  
Table 3. The control function used to assess services provided between CI. 
Services provided  
𝑆𝑖(𝑡) ∶= {  
1, 𝐶𝑖(𝑡)  ≥  𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖
𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  represents the 
maximum capability of 
any CI and is set to 100 
operations. Current CI capability 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖
 
Average CI demand 𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖 = assumed 90% of 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  
 
The function 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) is used to generate a relative value between 0 and 1 and is responsible for 
assessing the service provided from one CI to the other CI. It is not described in Canzani’s 
article (2016, p. 6) a specific unit of measurement for these values. This poses a challenge 
when creating a model which should be in accordance with the tests described in Sterman’s 
book (2000, pp. 859-861), to be considered reliable. His book serves in many cases as a 
reference for system dynamics best practice and the tests have been developed by countless 
scientists since the inception of system dynamics. A requirement for a model to be reliable is 
that there should be cohesiveness in the units across the entire model. Because the breakdown 
rate αi is affected by this function, the interdependencies of the CI are modelled as a formula 
where:  
𝛼𝑖(𝑡) =  ∑
𝑒𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑆
𝑗(𝑡))
|𝐽|
𝑗 ∈𝐽
 
The cardinality (sum of all elements in a set) of J represents the set of 5 CI; Water, Financial, 
ICT, Energy and Transport and it acts as a normalisation. This means that it ensures the 
breakdown rates for each CI has the same scale. The factor 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a value which represents the 
effects of an infrastructure disruption over a given time. These were collected by Canzani 
from a quantitative survey conducted in Ana Laugé’s doctoral dissertation at the the Faculty 
of technology of the Universidad de Navarra, Tecnun (Laugé, 2014). The eij-table created 
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from these contains the cascading effects on the five CI during a time interval of less than two 
hours. (Canzani, 2016, p. 7) This creates a problem for the simulations because these values 
are used by Canzani in simulations which lasts for up to 2 weeks and the disruption last for 24 
hours. Only in a closed scenario where the disruption length is of less than two hours can 
these values be considered appropriate, as it does not show in the article other values used for 
longer-lasting simulations.  
Based on this review of Canzani’s work it became apparent that a SIRS-adaptation to 
represent cascading effects is not ideal and a different model should be created. The proposed 
model must solve the inconsistencies of Canzani’s model and pass the tests outlined in 
Sterman’s book (Sterman, 2000) to be considered a valid substitute. The replicated model can 
be found in Appendix I. 
3 Methods 
To develop a working model and simulation of the cascading effects in linked critical 
infrastructures, it was necessary to create several working phases to the project. These phases 
corresponded directly to the goals described in the thesis introduction. The phases were 
research, development, testing and analysis of results. In the research phase the goal was to 
understand the current state of the field of study. This was done by conducting a literature 
study of the sources used by Canzani and finding other articles and work related to the field 
of study. The physical method of obtaining these articles and projects used involved using 
various academic search engines such as Google Scholar and ScienceDirect with key words 
such as “critical infrastructures” and “interdependency system dynamics”. Each article was 
studied, summarised and key points were written down and combined with each other to 
create a state of the art. A second part of the study was to review the previous work by 
Canzani and to establish if it was incorrect, inconsistent or inaccurate and make factual 
explanations as to why, if any. Furthermore, there was then a need to show how it could be 
changed or restructured into a more accurate, consistent, appropriate model.  
In the development phase there were several objects that needed to be created. First, the 
model used by Canzani had to be replicated in such a way that it would give the same results. 
An important part of this was selecting the program to use for simulations and modelling. 
There are several programs which are developed for system dynamics simulations and 
modelling, such as Powersim Studio (Powersim Software AS , 2018), Stella (isee systems, 
2018), Vensim (Ventana Systems, 2018) and Goldsim (GoldSim Technology Group, 2018). 
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Vensim DSS was selected because Canzani’s model was created in it and Vensim DSS is 
widely used. The DSS version of Vensim is an academic version of the program which was 
available from the University of Agder and previous courses had generated experience in 
using the software. User interface and figure representation were not considered when 
selecting the modelling software. Secondly, to replicate the model an in-depth study of it was 
conducted. It was apparent from Canzani’s results (2016, pp. 8-11) that the critical 
infrastructures were expected to behave in a certain way when a triggering disruption 
occurred. To replicate the behaviour, it was necessary to understand the underlying 
mathematical equations of the stocks and flows in the model, as well as the causal 
relationships between the various blocks representing the infrastructures.  Each variable, 
stock and flow in the model was identified (e.g. running operations ICT = OPrun(t)) and the 
model assembled together in iterations. During each step, Canzani’s article was consulted for 
accuracy. To verify that the thesis model simulations were run with the same parameters as 
the main article, iterations of the thesis model were sent via e-mail and reviewed by third 
parties and by Canzani to confirm accuracy. The results of the simulations were thus 
compared to the original results to verify that Canzani’s model was replicated to the 
maximum extent possible, without having access to the physical model. 
The results from the analysis of the replicated model was also used in determining how the 
thesis model needed to be and the possibility of it being a more suitable model to represent 
the cascading effects after a disruption. The thesis model was then derived from the replicated 
model, the literature study and a review of how epidemics behaves. The method of creating it 
was identical to the replication of Canzani’s model and parts were removed and variables 
redefined to reflect the new model. Test simulations were run during the creation of the thesis 
model to compare results iteratively. During the testing phase, the thesis model was subjected 
to the applicable tests outlined in Sterman’s book to build trust in the model that it is a viable 
alternative. (2000, pp. 859-861). This was followed by running simulations and analysing the 
results, according to the last phase. Furthermore, a worst-case scenario was created by 
analysing the selected CI and discovering the most significant elements, through a literature 
study. This was done to create a scenario in which a disruption would cause the maximum 
amount of damage possible. This information from the literature study was then used to 
propose a scenario where the disruption(s) would create the most damage across all 
infrastructure and simulated with the thesis model.  
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3.1 Survey 
 
To explore different scenarios where the model could be applied, an online, quantitative 
survey was created to gain an insight, if possible, to what cascading effects can occur if there 
is a disruption of critical infrastructures in Norway. The questions in this survey were derived 
from the survey conducted by Laugé (2014, p. 53) which asked experts in the field to rate on 
a scale of 1 to 5 the effects of one disrupted CI on other CI in different time intervals. This 
survey was distributed to experts in the field in Norway by e-mail. By expert it is meant those 
who oversee infrastructure security on a per-county level in Norway. The answers sought 
were percentage levels of performance of each CI during three separate time intervals where 
one of the five CI is down and affecting the others. The questions asked were “Assume that 
the j CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours, 24 hours or 7 days 
respectively. Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the 
performance level of the other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of 
the other CIs as consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the ICT CI will 
perform at eighty percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for 
ICT, and similarly for the other CIs”. The questions were asked in three iterations for each 
time interval, with the only change being the time interval itself and there was a last question 
which allowed the survey taker to comment on the quality of the survey. The percentage 
answers were mapped to a 1 to 5 scale, inserted into a table of eij-values and used in the 
simulations. The complete survey can be found in Appendix A.  
3.2 Worst-case scenario 
Because the scenarios simulated have their limitations in that they deal with single 
disruptions, it is of interest to see how the thesis model performs during scenarios that have 
different parameters, such as multiple disruptions or other parameters. By worst-case it is 
meant a situation in which the disruption causes an unprecedented amount of damage. A 
worst-case scenario simulation is valuable because it shows that the thesis model can 
accommodate extreme cases and give usable results. Because this thesis is heavily associated 
with ICT, it is natural to create a worst-case scenario which is seen from the ICT-perspective. 
An example of this is mentioned previously in section 2.3, where health infrastructure was 
severely impacted by the ICT CI being disrupted by a cyber-attack. However, it is worth 
considering that conducting a cyber-attack on ICT CI that inflicts catastrophic damage to all 
networked infrastructures, is unlikely (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 
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2015, p. 18). According to the tables representing the effects of downtime for CI created by 
Laugé (2014, pp. 170-175) Transport and Water are both less affected by cascading effects 
from ICT CI being disrupted than the Energy and Financial CI. With this as a background, it 
is feasible to describe a worst-case scenario in which an ICT attack vector is used on the 
Financial and Energy CI because these have larger dependency factors to ICT.  
The thesis model asserts that the modelled disruption d(t) has a certain magnitude, has a set 
duration and then it is passed. The nature of the disruption itself has no impact on the 
simulations, only its magnitude, length and time of occurrence. When constructing the worst-
case scenario, the nature of the disruption must be taken into consideration because it can 
affect these three variables. In ICT a disruption can come from a seemingly endless supply of 
attack vectors. As an example, a new text processing-program is launched to the public, 
written in less-than-secure code which has not been tested properly. It is assumed that this 
somehow passes inspection by chief information officer (CIO) of a given company and the 
program is distributed in the company. A disgruntled IT-employee that is let go due to 
downsizing decides to seek revenge and looks online for ways to injure the company. He 
comes across a database of hacks against this program the company recently acquired. He 
then proceeds to use his inside-knowledge of the company to distribute a malicious piece of 
software inside an e-mail, sent to his previous staff-manager which does not have IT-
experience or proper training. The malicious software executes and propagates itself, causing 
the company to suffer a revenue-disruption for a week before the malicious software is 
successfully purged from the system and the software patched. This scenario is one of many 
that can be thought of but serves to illustrate that there are several factors to consider. In 
connection to the elements in the thesis model, the time of the hack was when the malicious 
software was executed the first time in the company systems. The disruption length of the 
hack was a week and the magnitude of the disruption was so large that it caused loss in 
revenue. In the thesis model this disruption magnitude is estimated to be between 7 and 10. 
The example scenario refers to essentially a one-man disruption against a local company. In 
terms of networked CI, the size required of a disruption causing catastrophic damage to all CI 
is enlarged.  The CI must be dissected in a way that shows the core components that makes it 
possible to create a general attack scenario that would disrupt all CI significantly. In a 
literature study of the CI identified in this thesis, the core components were narrowed down to 
4 or 5 elements, depending on the CI. This limitation stems from there being numerous 
elements, devices or units making up a CI operation, making it a broad, out of scope part of 
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this thesis. The process of selecting a core component was based on the components 
description and how literature documented their relevance in a given CI.  
Table 4. The core components of the ICT and Energy CI respectively. For the ICT CI the core 
components are essentially devices that allow for communication, storage and display of 
information. For the Energy CI they reflect the distribution of energy and generation of 
energy from sources. Despite parts of both CI being automated, manpower is necessary to 
monitor, install or maintain systems. (Unicorn Systems a.s , 2016), (Farrell, et al. 2004) 
ICT CI Energy CI 
Servers 
Routers/Switches 
Wireless radio communications/phones 
Computers 
People (system administrators, employees 
etc.) 
Transformers 
Distribution networks (cabling) 
Energy sources (Power plants, etc) 
People (Employees, technical 
personnel etc.) 
 
Table 5. The Water, Financial and Transport CI components follow the same pattern as the 
ICT and Energy in that manpower is essential for daily upkeep. The Water components are 
those that maintain a flow of water in whichever form necessary. The Financial components 
are somewhat more abstract, yet the components are crucial for enabling trade, banking and 
other financial work. The Transport components are those necessary to enable the 
transportation on a vehicular level, though there exist other definitions of what kind of 
operations transport infrastructure perform. (Hooper, 2006), (Norges Bank, 2014), (Zdeněk 
Dvořáka et al. 2017) 
Water CI Financial CI 
 
Transport CI 
Aggregates 
Asphalt/concrete 
Piping 
Hydraulic pumps 
People (general 
manpower, plumbers 
etc.) 
Interbank systems 
Bank settlement systems 
Stock markets 
Banks  
People (Employees, bankers 
etc.) 
Road networks 
Fuel 
Bridges 
Tunnels  
People (Drivers, operators etc.) 
 
From the components in the tables and the literature studied it shows that to perform a worst-
case scenario-type of attack would require multiple attacks from several different angles to 
create maximum amount of damage. According to the Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2015) several Norwegian CI 
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have their own communication systems which are shut off from public interference, which 
would limit the success a single ICT attack from the outside might have. However, because of 
interdependencies at some or several levels, cascading effects do occur after the disruption of 
one CI happens. This infers that if multiple disruptions are targeted towards the respective CIs 
and launched sequentially, but not necessarily at the same time, they could possibly do a lot 
of damage combined. 
In Canzani’s model and simulations, multiple disruptions were demonstrated and showed that 
disruptions in ICT, followed by Energy afterwards, ensured that ICT CI took longer to 
recover (2016, p. 10). In this worst-case scenario the Energy CI is subject to an attack first, 
ICT CI follows and lastly the Financial CI are attacked. The order of the attack is decided 
based upon the level of interdependency each CI has on the other.  The simulation time is one 
week and the disruption time td for the Energy CI is at 15 hours, which emulates the attack 
happening in the evening and that time t = 0 is at 06:00 in the morning. Each CI is assumed 
attacked via an ICT vector, be it a hack or some type other ICT-related interference (SCADA 
systems in the Energy CI being disrupted directly or indirectly etc.) The magnitude of each 
attack will be identical, the reasoning being that the attackers goal is to ensure that the 
respective CI are completely disrupted, i.e. Running operations and services provided are 
equal to 0 for as long as possible. The length of the disruption for each CI will be 24 hours. 
The example of the ‘Wannacry’-disruption in section 2.3 is the basis for this, because the 
length of that disruption before it was stopped, was less than 24 hours. The interval between 
each disruption will be 6 hours, allowing the cascading effects to take place and then be 
subject to further disruption. Another important factor is the average repair and restore time 
for the CI to return to service. Building on the length of the disruption, the Energy CI average 
repair and restore time will be set to 24 hours. Each consecutive CI that suffers a disruption 
will have an average repair and restore time that is 6 hours longer than the previous, 
representing that the cascading effects have taken a toll on the CI being repaired and restored.  
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4 The thesis model 
From the review of Canzani’s model and model replication it was discovered that it could be 
improved in several ways. Due to the limitation of not having Canzani’s model as Vensim 
model file in hand, I had to build the replicated model based on the description given in 
(Canzani, 2016). The proposed thesis model would not be considered a SIRS-model 
adaptation because as discussed in chapter 2.4.1 there are significant elements lacking that 
prohibits the SIRS-model to be effective for simulating cascading infrastructure disruptions. 
Because of this, the thesis model would not be related to epidemiology in any form. It would 
need to be rigorously tested to ensure that it fulfils the passes the tests and requirements as 
described in (Sterman, 2000, pp. 859-861) so it can be trusted as a reliable model. To create 
the thesis model, two major changes had to happen. Firstly, the Recovered state had to be 
removed altogether. Secondly, the eij-table values used to model interdependencies would 
have to be corrected to correspond to the actual disruption length, be it less than two hours, 24 
hours or more. The structures in the model are divided into three types which are variables, 
stocks and flows.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The box Running operations represents the stock, the Maximum capability is a 
variable influencing the stock, and the Breakdown rate is a flow of either reduction or 
increase and is in this example affected by the running operations. The connection between 
the variable, stock and flow is represented by the blue arrows. Created in Vensim DSS. 
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Table 6. The table shows the variables, stocks and flows which are used in the thesis model. 
The suffix j represents the CI which suffer a direct disruption, whereas the suffix i represents 
the set of networked CIs, which suffer the cascading effects of the disruption on CI j. 
Variables Stocks  Flows 
Average demand i 
Average demand j 
Services provided i 
Services provided j 
Current capability i 
Current capability j 
Max capability i 
Max capability j 
Average repair and restore 
time i 
Average repair and restore 
time j 
Disruption 
Running operations i 
Running operations j 
Down operations i 
Down operations j 
Breakdown rate j 
Breakdown rate i 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The proposed thesis model with the Recovered state removed where i represents the 
set of 4 CI affected by the disruption occurring in CI j. Created in Vensim DSS. 
running
operations j
down
operations j
return to service j
break down rate j
Disruption
max capability j
current capability j
average demand j
services provided j
running
operations i
down
operations i
return to service i
break down rate i
max capability i
current capability i
average demand i
services provided i
average repair and
restore time i
average repair and
restore time j
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The mathematical equations have been altered to reflect the change in states. The thesis 
model does not conform to the SIRS-model representation or equations, but this does not 
limit the usage of them in the thesis model. It naturally means that it cannot be claimed that it 
is a SIRS model. The relations between the two states have been kept the same. The variables 
from Canzani’s model, “average repair time” and “average unit time to restore” have been 
aggregated into one new variable. This new variable has been renamed to “average repair and 
restore time” and is found in each CI. Setting the new value for this was equal to the sum of 
the “average repair time” and “average unit time to restore” variables. According to Canzani1 
there was no decisive data or reasoning behind the value of these other than setting it to a 
seemingly reasonable value related to the simulation length. 
Because of this, the reasoning behind the new aggregated variable is the same but it does 
create a new area of study. If a disruption in the Energy CI causes the lack in production of 
fuel, this could harm the Transport CI but presumptuously would not cripple it immediately. 
However, the repair and restoration time could, also presumptuously, be considered more 
significant compared to if there is a short power outage, causing traffic lights flickering for a 
limited time before power is restored. This example shows that the value of the average repair 
and restore time would highly depend on the type of disruption that occurs. Because the 
repair and restoration time can thus change drastically depending on the disruption type, it 
ultimately led to the sum of the two variables being used but it could be subject to change.  
 Table 7. The new differential equations used in the thesis model 
When comparing Table 7 with Table 3 the equations for the states Running operations and 
Down operations are like Canzani’s model but different due to the variable 𝛾 having absorbed 
the previous unit restoration constant β and the removed Recovered operations state. The 
services provided-function in block 3 remains identical to Canzani’s-model. Because of the 
lack of access to the Canzani’s model there are as previously discussed a limitation to the 
                                                 
1 Canzani E. 2018. System dynamics modelling. E-mail correspondence 21.01.2018. (Farstad T.) 
Running 
operations 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) =  −𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
) + 𝛾𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) 
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) = Running 
operations 
Down 
operations 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) =  𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
) − 𝛾𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) 
𝑂𝑃𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑡) = Down 
operations 
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knowledge about how it looks and works in detail. When going through the measurement 
units for each element in the Canzani’s-model, there was discovered a problem in unit 
definition for the services provided. This problem followed into the thesis model, naturally 
because the services provided block is the same. The problem was that no valid unit of 
measurement for it the output of the function 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) that gives a number between 0 and 1. 
When this value is used in the breakdown rate of CI i, it creates unit definition errors in the 
breakdown rates. To correct this, each unit in the thesis model was assessed and the meaning 
of each evaluated. Each CI has a set amount of operations it can perform at any time. The 
maximum capability 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  is set to 100 operations. It follows then that the increase or 
decrease in the Running operations should be the measured by a ratio of operations over time. 
Unfortunately, Canzani’s model is not describing this in the paper in detail, therefore it could 
not confidently be said say that this is how the unit is measured, but from the understanding 
of system dynamics and modelling it is logical that it should be measured this way.  
The eij-parameters became the solution to the problem with unit measurement. They are 
answers in response to the survey-question: “Which effect would your CI have if the 
following CI were down for…” (Laugé, 2014, p. 166) The average value of the answers was 
then calculated and represents the effect of one CI disruption would have on another. It is 
argued that assigning the ratio unit operations/time to the eij-values is appropriate because the 
experts answering the survey in terms of system dynamics were interpreting the value of the 
rate −𝛼 (
𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝑛𝑂𝑃
). This also comes from considering the rate describes the reduction of 
operations at time t when the disruption occurs. In the physical modelling, a factor called Unit 
normalisation was introduced and multiplied with each breakdown rate for every CI. It 
contains a value of 1 operations/hour. This also ensured that even though the services 
provided output between 0 and 1 is dimensionless, it is appropriate. There was no studied 
literature or data that showed a viable option of unit of measurement for services provided by 
a CI. Considering that the services provided is affected also by a percentage of demand, this 
makes the constant 𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖  also dimensionless. After solving this problem, all variables and 
elements in the thesis model had an appropriate unit of measurement. The complete thesis 
model that shows the variables and their units of measurements is found in Appendix J. 
To solve the third problem regarding the use of correct eij-parameters for the correct 
disruption length in the simulations, the survey-tables created by Laugé (2014, pp. 170-175) 
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were reviewed and the table values for the eij parameters were adjusted manually to the 
appropriate disruption length. These have been mapped into tables 8-10 directly.  
Table 8. The eij-parameters corresponding to a disruption which lasts for less than 2 hours.  
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
Energy N/A 0.86 1.33 2.67 2.40 
ICT 2.67 N/A 1.00 2.33 2.40 
Water 0.57 0.83 N/A 0.00 0.20 
Financial 0.71 0.17 0.00 N/A 0.60 
Transport 1.00 1.17 0.00 1.00 N/A 
 
Table 9. The eij-parameters corresponding to a disruption which lasts for less than 24 hours.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. The eij-parameters corresponding to a disruption which lasts for more than one 
week.  
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
Energy N/A 4.57 4.57 4.67 4.20 
ICT 4.67 N/A 3.67 4.67 4.60 
Water 3.43 3.50 N/A 1.00 2.60 
Financial 2.43 3.00 2.00 N/A 2.20 
Transport 3.00 3.83 3.67 3.67 N/A 
 
The parameters in the tables are read as columns, i.e. if the ICT CI is down for less than two 
hours, Energy (Table 8, column one, row two) is affected by a value of 0.86 operations/hour, 
Water for 0.83 operations/hour, and so forth. (Laugé et al. 2014). The online survey 
questionnaire in this thesis asked the experts to evaluate cascading effects for three set 
intervals, 2 hours, 24 hours and 7 days. These are different from those conducted by Laugé 
(2014) because the time intervals are fixed and not an inequality, i.e. less than two hours, 
more than two hours, and so on. The questions in the online survey are also phrased 
differently. This ensured that the survey is unique and not a mere replica. The responses from 
the survey sent out to experts were mapped to the tables 11-13 and is read identically to tables 
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
Energy N/A 3.71 3.00 4.00 3.00 
ICT 3.71 N/A 2.33 4.00 3.40 
Water 2.14 2.83 N/A 0.33 1.40 
Financial 1.14 1.83 0.00 N/A 1.40 
Transport 1.43 2.00 1.33 2.00 N/A 
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8-10. The mapping from percentage to integer was done by dividing the percentage answered 
with 100 and multiply by 5. This value was then subtracted from 5, yielding the respective eij-
parameter. In cases where there were more than one answer, the average was then calculated 
of all the answers and mapped with the same mathematical method. 
Table 11. The mapped eij-parameters representing the cascading effects on CI from 
disruptions lasting for two hours, taken from the online survey results. 
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
Energy N/A 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.25 
ICT 0.00 N/A 0.00 0.00 0.25 
Water 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 0.00 
Financial 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 
Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
 
Table 12. The mapped eij-parameters representing the cascading effects on CI from 
disruptions lasting for 24 hours, taken from the online survey results. The asterisk * indicates 
a response which is likely to be erroneous when compared to earlier responses from the same 
expert. It is included however and have been used in the simulations. 
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
ICT N/A 1.00 2.50 5.00* 1.00 
Energy 0.00 N/A 0.00 0.00 0.25 
Water 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 2.00 
Financial 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 
Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
 
Table 13. The mapped eij-parameters representing the cascading effects on CI from 
disruptions lasting for 7 days, taken from the online survey results. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
F
ai
le
d
 C
I 
 Effect on CI 
 Energy ICT Water Financial Transport 
Energy N/A 3.00 3.50 3.50 1.38 
ICT 3.00 N/A 1.00 1.00 0.38 
Water 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 2.25 
Financial 1.00 1.00 0.00 N/A 0.63 
Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
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5 Testing 
The purpose of testing the system dynamics model was to develop a trust that it is suitable for 
its purpose and the problem it addresses, according to the desired specifications (Sterman, 
2000) (Barlas, 1996). Consequently, this allows decision makers and users of the system 
dynamics model to trust the accuracy of its results. To ensure this, there are several tests 
which can assess the thesis model from various perspectives. The thesis model would be 
tested against all applicable tests (Sterman, 2000, pp. 859-861). In the rest of this section each 
test will be described, shown if it is applicable to the thesis model and an assessment if the 
thesis model passed the respective test will be presented. 
5.1 Boundary Adequacy 
The boundary adequacy test examines if the thesis model contains all relevant aspects of a 
structure. In this work the relevant structures are those that enable a successful representation 
of how cascading effects happen after a disruption in networked CI. There should be some 
level (stock) which represents operations of a given CI. When a CI experiences reduction in 
operations in whichever form they may take, there needs to be a reduction rate, or in this case 
a breakdown rate (flow). To show that the CI can return to its original level of function, there 
must accordingly be a restore rate, i.e. return to service. Emulating the cascading effects from 
one CI to the other requires some variable that represents the effect a CI has on the other, 
which in turn affects the corresponding CI. In the thesis model the physical structures 
Running operations, Down operations, breakdown rates and return to service represent each 
individual CI. These are linked via services provided by each CI. The services provided is a 
function which assesses the services a CI has at any time which is added to the interdependent 
other CIs breakdown rate and is affected by the cascading parameters eij. Accordingly, the 
thesis model contains all relevant and needed structure to pass the boundary test. 
5.2 Structure assessment 
The purpose of this test is to assess the structure of the thesis model. This means that we want 
to see if the model has a real-world application and that it can represent a real-world system. 
In relation to the thesis model, it is to see if the thesis model appropriately represents a real 
CI. It must conform to physics and be logical to represent a real CI. It conforms to physics by 
having all the stocks represent physical operations performed by a CI, and the 
reduction/increase are logical. The disruption causes a decrease in the operations level. A 
restoration causes the operations level to increase. The thesis model contains these stocks and 
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flows which also are in Canzani’s model, but the Recovered operations stock and the repair 
flow have been eliminated. The repair flow has been aggregated into a composite flow, 
exiting Down operations stock and entering the Running operations stock. This aggregation is 
logical because it represents the real-world time it would take to repair a CI and restore its 
operations. This represents the real world more appropriately because the working, non-
working and recovered CIs does not resemble the SIRS model in terms of having an 
immunity period during which no disruption can occur. This is evaluated from a realistic 
point of view that a CI is either running or down.  
5.3 Dimensional consistency 
For a model to be sustainable and realistic, it is important that each variable has a unit of 
measurement which is dimensionally consistent with the rest of the model. As the stocks and 
flows are based on sets of differential equations, each side of these equations should have the 
same unit, which shows that the equations are legitimate equations. As an example, in the 
thesis model CI output is defined as operations. A reduction in operations would then be with 
a rate of operations/hour, as discussed in section 2.4.1. Each variable, stock and flow in the 
thesis model consists of either operations, operations/hour or dimensionless units. Vensim 
DSS was used to successfully test the unit consistency without errors, making the model 
dimensionally consistent. Therefore, the thesis model passes this test. A listing of all variables 
and their units of measurement is included in the thesis model found in Appendix J 
5.4 Parameter assessment  
The purpose of the parameter assessment is to examine if “the parameter values are consistent 
with the relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge of the system” (Sterman, 2000, p. 
859) The eij-parameters represent the cascading effect one CI has on the other CI it is 
connected. This means that each eij-parameter has a meaning behind it. The parameters 
numerical data were collected via a survey conducted in the thesis project as well as a survey 
conducted by Laugé (2014, pp. 155-167) These two requirements are fulfilled, and the thesis 
model passes the test. 
5.5 Extreme conditions  
This test is designed to see if the mathematical equations behave correctly or reasonably 
when inputs exceed the allowed limits, representing a shock factor to the system or 
unexpected behaviour. Because infrastructure behaviour modelling serves as a simplified 
version of actual behaviour, this test serves as a reality check because it is possible for 
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external events to exceed expected limits. When conducting this test, several of the key 
variables, such as the eij, average demand and capability-parameters were adjusted to 
unexpected values and simulations were run. When the eij-table values were set to values that 
exceeded 5, the thesis model gave expected results. This is because when the interdependency 
level of the CI exceeds 5, the results after a disruption should be that the all the CI have their 
performance levels reduced further. This is because the reduction in operations/hour is 
increased even more. When the eij-values were 0≤eij<1, the thesis model behaved as it should, 
albeit not without significant changes because the cascade effects for some infrastructures 
became 0. This does however show that the cascade effects are happening when there is a 
value greater than 0. In the thesis model it is not logical that the eij-parameters should be less 
than 0, as this means that the CI are gaining a higher number of running operations when a 
disruption occurs. However illogical, it was tested and shown that the thesis model performed 
expectedly when eij<0.  
When the average demand was adjusted to higher than 100% the thesis model performed 
expectedly. This scenario does however not hold any logical relevance when working under 
the assumption that an infrastructure cannot at any point in time yield higher than 100% 
output. The demand could be considered higher than 100% but the output cannot logically 
exceed 100%.  When the average demand was lower than 90% the thesis model behaved as 
expected because service provided was less affected by the disruption, which follows since 
the demand for the services were lower. The last variable tested was the maximum capability 
of the CI. The maximum capability cannot be less than 0. A CI cannot have negative 
capability, which would be illogical. Because the ratio of Current capability = Running 
operations/maximum capability, when the maximum capability is 0 there is a mathematical 
inconsistency when dividing with 0. It could theoretically occur that a CI has no capability at 
all, but this scenario does not seem probable because CI are considered critical to everyday 
operations in society as discussed in section 2.2. This implies that 0 operations in output 
would disqualify it as a CI. When testing this unlikely scenario, the expected results were 
errors due to the division with 0. In Vensim this error was solved by inserting a MIN-function 
inside an IF THEN ELSE-clause in the breakdown rates for each CI. The MIN-function 
returns the smaller value of A and B. A is considered the breakdown rate and B represents the 
maximum capability divided by the time step and the IF THEN ELSE ensures that the 
running operations never go below zero and the zero-division problem disappears, and the 
results are expected. The running operations are assumed to be at 100 at time t=0 which they 
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all were when the maximum capability was 0. The service provided was equal to 0, which 
also was expected. After testing the relevant variables and rates, the thesis model passes this 
test. The relevant graphs for this test are found in Appendix B. 
5.6 Integration test  
When the thesis model equations are simulated using a specific numerical integration method 
and/or specific time-step, it is important to be sure that it is not dependent on either the 
integration method or the time-step. The thesis model should behave the same way regardless 
of changes to the integration methods or time step used. By testing different time-step values 
starting from a small time step in combination with different integration methods in Vensim 
DSS, it is proved that it passes the test because there were no significant changes in the 
results aside from two integration methods (Runge-Kutta 2/4 Auto methods) which caused 
alert messages but still provided the same results, regardless of change in time step.  
5.7 Behaviour reproduction test 
The model passes this test if it reproduces the behaviour of the original real-time system. 
However, this test requires a historical behaviour of the original system (reference mode) to 
compare the thesis model behaviour against. Accordingly, it is not applicable to the thesis 
model because there has not been found a reference mode for it to compare the results with. 
5.8 Family member test 
The family test assesses if the thesis model can represent more than one instance of the 
system, i.e. reproduce the behaviour of different instances of the same time. In the context of 
this thesis the 5 CI contained in the thesis model could be applied to different counties in 
Norway. Parameter values for each county should be used and fed to the thesis model to 
reproduce individual results specific for that county. Because this data is not present in the 
thesis and the results from the thesis survey are not sufficient to evaluate this, this test is not 
applicable to the thesis model. 
5.9 Sensitivity analysis 
The purpose of the test is to find out how the thesis model behaves when confronted with 
uncertainties regarding assumptions made in the modelling. As an example, an assumption in 
the thesis model is that the average time to repair and restore the CI is set to a certain value. 
This value can then be tested to see if the simulations changes significantly if this value is 
different. The sensitivity test is comprised of two parts, numerical and behavioural. For this 
thesis model, the numerical test is not applicable because there is no reference mode with 
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which to compare the output. The behavioural test is applicable because it shows how the 
tested variables are behaving when the input is changing. This means that if the behaviour, or 
output of the thesis model, changes when alternate assumptions are made, then the thesis 
model is considered sensitive to behaviour mode. There are two types of methods for testing 
behaviour, univariate and multivariate. In univariate, the value of one parameter is being 
changed at a time meanwhile all other parameters included in the test are kept at their original 
values, whereas in multivariate all parameters being tested are changed at the same time. 
When approaching this test, it was important to identify key parameters, then see how the 
stocks i.e. running operations or down operations, respond to the change. The thesis model is 
simulated several times and applies a range of values to the selected variables. For this test, 
the number of simulations selected was 200, which is the default-value in Vensim DSS. 
Tables 14 and 15 show the variables tested and the corresponding stocks monitored after the 
simulations were run. 
Table 14. Variables tested in the sensitivity 
test. 
Variable 
Average repair and restore time Energy 
Average repair and restore time ICT 
Average repair and restore time Water 
Average repair and restore time Financial 
Average repair and restore time Transport 
Effect on CI1 from CI2 
Average Demand Energy 
Average Demand ICT 
Average Demand Water 
Average Demand Financial 
Average Demand Transport 
Table 15. Stocks monitored during the 
sensitivity test. 
Stocks 
Running Operations Energy 
Running Operations ICT 
Running Operations Water 
Running Operations Financial 
Running Operations Transport 
 
For the average repair and restore time variables, the base value was set to 47 hours, as 
discussed in section 4 previously. The sensitivity test was then conducted as a multivariate 
test, with values ranging from 0 hour to 72 hours for each average repair and restore variable, 
representing the varying degree of disruption that might occur and that in some cases the 
average time to repair and restore can be shorter and vice versa.  
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The Average Demand variables are assumed to be 90% of maximum capability for each CI. 
In the sensitivity test the tested range for these variables were set to a starting value of 50%, 
and maximum value of 100%, reflecting that the demand for can change over time. This test 
was also conducted with the multivariate method because there are 5 Average Demand- 
variables in total, in which the outcome is expected to be similar. 
The final part of the behaviour sensitivity testing is the array which consists of all the eij-
parameters that describe the effects of the cascade each CI has on the others. Because the 
array consists of values ranging from 0 to 5, it is applicable to test for all values in the range. 
When testing, it was performed as a combination of univariate and multivariate. For each CI 
(univariate), each effect-variable (eij) from the networked CI (multivariate) was then tested 
with values ranging from 0 to 5 and the Running operations-stock for the respective CI tested 
was monitored.  
With all the relevant variables tested, the test-results show that the thesis model output-
change in the stocks is expected and the thesis model does not express behaviour mode 
sensitivity regardless of the change in the parameter-values used. Based on this it is 
appropriate to say that the model passes this test. With all the applicable tests performed on 
the thesis model and the passing of the tests, the thesis model can be trusted to behave 
realistically and within the confines of the boundaries it was created for. 
 
Figure 5. The results of multivariate sensitivity testing of the average repair and restore time 
variable for the Energy CI. The graph shows that after 200 simulations, the average repair and 
restore value can be anything between 0 and 72 hours and still shows the same type of output 
i.e. the graph follows the same pattern regardless of the value. This is also true for all the 
other CI with their corresponding average repair and restore time variables. The results for the 
respective CI can be found in Appendix C. 
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Figure 6. The results from the multivariate sensitivity testing of the average demand for the 
Water CI. The figure shows that any demand between 50 and 100% will yield the type of 
behaviour in that the running operations show the same pattern in the graph, regardless of 
what the demand is. This also holds for all the CI, and the respective results can be found in 
the Appendix D. 
 
 
Figure 7. The results of a multivariate behavioural sensitivity test for each cascading factor 
affecting the Transport CI. The figure shows that no matter the value of the cascading factors, 
the output can be expected and is similar. The behaviour of the Running operations for each 
CI shows the same pattern of behaviour when evaluating the graph results. All the results for 
each CIs Running Operations in this test can be found in Appendix E. 
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6 Results 
A significant part of the thesis was to replicate Canzani’s model. However, the results from 
the simulations run with replicated model are not included in section because they only show 
how well the model was replicated when compared to Canzani’s model, and do not contain 
any new results as such. They are found in Appendix F. The results from the simulated 
scenarios with the thesis model are in this section divided into three parts. The first part 
contains the results from running one scenario Canzani created, this time simulated with the 
thesis model. The parameters used will be identical to Canzani’s simulations. The second part 
of the results are those where the simulations were run using correct eij-parameters taken from 
tables 8-10 which corresponding to the respective disruption length, and results from using 
the eij-parameters in tables 11-13 created from the survey responses. Further, there are three 
disruption magnitudes (2, 4 and 9) for each eij-parameter interval (less than 2 hours, less than 
24 hours and more than one week) and the respective disruption length. The simulations with 
the thesis model yielded many result-graphs, which for the sake of brevity have been 
shortened, and the complete results are found in the appendices G-H. The third part contains 
the results of simulating the designed worst-case scenario with the thesis model.  
 
6.1 Canzani’s scenario 
 
6.1.1 Single disruption with large magnitude  
This part contains the results from simulating an ICT CI disruption with magnitude md = 9, 
indicative of a large disruption. The disruption occurs at time td = 48 hours of the simulation 
and lasts for ∆Td = 24 hours with the eij-parameters from table 8 in section 4. The results 
show that the running operations of the ICT CI are in the space of 12 hours reduced to 0% 
output, which lasts for another 12 hours before the recovery process starts. The ICT CI does 
not recover to 100% output for the rest of the simulation time. The operations of the other CIs 
are reduced to 87% (Energy CI) at the most before they start recovering. They recover to 
100% by the end of the simulation time. The ICT services provided are reduced to none but 
recovers to 100% on day 7.5 of the simulation time. The other CIs are not affected 
significantly by the reduced services from the ICT CI. The graph results are shown in figures 
8 and 9. 
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Figure 8. The running operations of the ICT CI is reduced to 0% for 12 hours before recovery 
starts. The other CIs are affected by this down to about 87% at the most, for Transport, 
Energy and Financial CI. The recovery for the linked CI is complete by the end of the 
simulation time. 
 
 
Figure 9. The services provided by the ICT CI are reduced to 0% for 12 hours before 
recovery starts. ICT services are restored by day 7.5 of the simulation time. The Energy CI is 
the only CI that is affected by the reduced ICT services, but not more than a few percent 
reduction, which is restored after 5 days of the simulation time.   
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6.2 Revised scenarios with correct eij-parameters and disruption length 
 
6.2.1 Single disruption with large magnitude for less than 24 hours 
This simulation uses the eij-parameters corresponding to the CI being down for less than 24 
hours as observed by Laugé (2014, p. 173). These are found in table 9 in section 4. The 
disruption with magnitude md = 9 occurs in the ICT CI at td = 48 hours and lasts for ∆Td =24 
hours. The running operations of the ICT CI are reduced to 0% for 12 hours before recovery 
starts. The linked CI are all affected by the disruption and the financial CI is reduced the most 
to about 83% before recovery starts. The service provided by the ICT CI is also disrupted and 
reduced to 0% for 12 hours before recovering. The services of the other CIs are reduced to 
about 93%, with the financial services suffering the most from the disruption. By day 7.5 the 
services are restored to 100% and by the end of the simulation period the running operations 
of all CI has been restored to 100%. All results for this section are found in Appendix H. This 
is shown in figures 10 and 11.  
 
Figure 10. The results from ICT CI being disrupted with a magnitude of 9 for less than 24 
hours. The ICT CI is reduced to 0% 12 hours after the disruption first occurred. It remains at 
0% for 12 hours before recovery starts. The other CIs are being affected, the financial CI 
being hit the hardest and reduced to about 83% before recovering. By the end of the two-
week simulation the operations are restored for all CI. 
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Figure 11. The service provided by the ICT CI is reduced when a disruption occurs at time 48 
hours. 12 hours after the disruption, the ICT services are 0 and remain 0 for 12 more hours 
before they start recovering. The other CIs are reduced to about 93% at most before they start 
recovering. By day 7.5 all the CI services have been restored.  
 
6.2.2 Single disruption with large magnitude for more than one week. 
In this scenario the disruption md = 9 has been kept the same as the simulation done in section 
6.2.1. The eij-parameters have been changed to reflect how the CI are affected by a cascading 
disruption which lasts for more than one week, which are found in table 10 in section 4. The 
running operations of the ICT CI are disrupted at time td = 48 hours which lasts for ∆Td = 168 
hours. 12 hours after the disruption the operations of the ICT CI are at 0%. They remain there 
for another 6.5 days before recovery starts. The other CIs are affected and reduced to about 
59% at the most (Energy CI) before they start to recover. None of the CI operations return to 
100% by the end of the two-week simulation. The results are shown in figures 12 and 13. 
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Figure 12. The results of a disruption of the ICT CI with a magnitude of 9, occurring at 48 
hours and lasting for 168 hours. The ICT CI is down to 0 operations 12 hours after the 
disruption occurs and remains at 0% for another 6.5 days before recovery starts. The other 
CIs are affected by this and reduced to about 59%% at most before they start recovering. The 
running operations never fully recover higher than about 95% during the simulation time. 
 
 
Figure 13. The service provided by the ICT CI is reduced when a disruption occurs at time 48 
hours. 12 hours after the disruption, the ICT services are 0% and remain 0% for 6.5 more 
days before they start recovering. The other CI services are reduced to about 65% at most 
before they start recovering. The services are not restored by the end of the 2 week 
simulation. 
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6.3 Results from scenarios with parameters from the online survey 
The scenarios simulated in this section have the same outline as in section 6.2.2 This means 
that the disruption lasts for one week, the disruption magnitude is 9 and occurs at 48 hours. 
The eij-parameters have been changed to those found in table 13. The parameters for table 13 
have been calculated from the responses to the online survey. The other results from 
simulating the same scenarios as 6.1 and 6.2.1, this time with tables 11-12, can be found in 
Appendix G. The results show that the ICT CI is reduced to 0% output in operations and 
services 12 hours after the disruption occurs and it stays down for 6.5 days before recovering. 
The other CIs are affected by this disruption to some degree. The Energy CI suffers the most 
from the cascading effects, but operations are only reduced to about 78% at the most before it 
starts recovery. None of the CI are fully restored to 100% running operations by the end of 
the two weeks. The service provided results follow the same pattern as the running 
operations, except all the CI fully recovers by the end of the simulations.  
 
Figure 14. The results from simulating a one week disruption using the eij-parameters from 
the online survey. The ICT CI is reduced to 0% 12 hours after the disruption occurs and is 
down for another 6.5 days before the recovery begins. The other CIs are affected, Energy CI 
being reduced the most to about 78% before recovering. None of the CI fully recover by the 
end of the two weeks. 
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Figure 15. The service provided during the week long disruption. The ICT CI is reduced to 
0% 12 hours after the disruption and gives no service for 6.5 days before recovery starts. The 
CI services fully recovers by the end of the two weeks. The other CIs are lightly affected, the 
Energy CI being reduced to about 88% at the most before recovering. 
 
6.4 Results from simulating the proposed worst-case scenario 
The simulations for the worst-case scenario follow the parameters outlined in the description 
of the scenario in section 3.2. The disruption magnitude md is set to 9 for all disruptions. The 
length of the simulation is one week. The disruptions occur to the Energy CI, ICT CI and 
Financial CI at time t = 15, 21 and 27 hours, respectively. The disruption duration for each CI 
is 24 hours. The average repair and restore time for the Energy CI is 24 hours, ICT CI 30 and 
Financial CI is 36 hours. The results show that the multiple disruptions occur at 6 hours 
intervals of each other and they cause the other CIs affected to have a longer restore time to 
get back to full output. The Water and Transport CI are less affected by the all the 
disruptions. The Water CI is the least affected and does not go below 80% in performance. 
The Transport CI drops to about 87% performance at the lowest point before restoration 
starts. None of the operations for any CI are restored completely by the end of the week. The 
services provided by the disrupted CI show a similar pattern as the disrupted operations, but 
services are completely restored for all CI by day 6 of the simulations. 
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Figure 16. The results from running multiple disruptions consecutively with the thesis model. 
The directly disrupted CI are all reduced to 0 operations for 12 hours each before they start 
recovering. Due to multiple disruptions and increased repair and restore time for the CI 
affected, the restore time for all CI has increased and none of the CI are fully recovered to 
100% by the end of the week. 
 
 
Figure 17. The results from simulating multiple consecutive disruptions against the Energy, 
ICT and Financial CIs. The services are reduced to 0 % for all CI suffering a direct disruption 
and the cascading effects causes the restoration time to increase before they are back to 
100%. By day 6 the services have all been restored. 
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7. Discussion 
The results from the simulations show a representation of cascading effects occurring during 
several disruptions. The scenarios used have been like those run by Canzani, the scenarios 
containing data from the online survey conducted and the worst-case scenario. The thesis 
model results are also like the results by Canzani which shows that the reasoning and 
ambition behind Canzani’s model was indeed promising for the modelling of cascading 
effects, despite the incorrect usage of the SIRS-model to represent this as well as incorrect 
usage of eij-parameters. Because the thesis model passed the applicable tests as described in 
section 5 it has a foundation as a trustworthy model that can represent the cascading effects of 
disruptions whilst not being a SIRS-adaptation and it solves the problems with using a SIRS-
model for this area of study. Due to the lack of responses from the online survey conducted, 
the simulations run with the responses received, cannot be representative for Norway as a 
country. At best it can be representative of the county expert responsible for that sector which 
answered the survey, which of itself could be beneficial to that county, if not representative. 
The results are differing significantly from the survey results of Laugé (2014, pp. 170-176) 
due to that fact. However, the results support the assertion that since many CI have internal 
communications channels that are not public, they can still manage some form of 
communication and an ICT CI disruption alone will most likely not destroy these completely 
(2015, p. 18). This is seen particularly in figures 14 and 15. The cascading effects the ICT 
disruption has on the other CIs, even when the magnitude is high, and the disruption length is 
one week, are low.  
This causes the scenarios themselves to be hypothetical and several assumptions have been 
made which may be different in a real-life situation. This applies especially to the worst-case 
scenario, which mostly consist of assumptions and hypotheticals. To create the worst-case 
scenario however would be a seemingly impossible task due to the many variables that have 
to be considered for it to be effective. The thesis model itself contains only so many variables 
and this creates limited types of input. It can be argued that if variables were further 
investigated and where possible be further dissected to find more useful variables, they could 
have a more profound effect in the simulations. The average repair time and restore-variable 
is of interest but with little background to support its values. In the literature study of the CI 
interdependencies in section 2.3 there was not found much data to support the assigned value. 
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Canzani commented2 about the equivalent values used in her model, the average repair and 
average unit time to restore-variables that she did not have a specific reasoning for their 
values. It can be reasoned though that the average repair and restore time would increase for 
each CI being affected by a disruption, as a type of add-on factor to the cascading effects. In 
the worst-case scenario this is modelled accordingly and shows that for each consecutive CI 
suffering a disruption, the respective recovery time is prolonged. The multiple disruptions do 
create the same type of behaviour for each CI, which is natural and logical because the 
disruptive function is modelled identically. This can also be a somewhat limited view because 
when looking at the core components in tables 4 and 5 of the various CI in section 3.2, it is 
apparent that the disruptions could be modelled more in detail for each CI specifically. 
However, the benefit with the disruption factor as it is used in the thesis model is that it gives 
an abstract impression without too much detail. 
When the Energy, ICT and Financial CI went down with short time intervals between them, 
this caused them to have similar breakdown rates and the total recovery time was prolonged. 
The results from the multiple disruptions simulated (Canzani, 2016, p. 10) differ from the 
worst case simulation because they happen later in the simulated time. Her disruption of the 
Energy CI occurs at td = 96 hours, which is 72 hours after the initial ICT CI disruption. 
Furthermore, the disruptions have different magnitudes and durations. In the worst-case 
scenario the Energy, ICT and Financial CI disruptions occur at td = 15, 21 and 27 hours 
respectively, with identical disruption magnitudes and durations. It can be argued that 
Canzani’s simulated scenario is more realistic regarding multiple disruptions because the 
probability of disrupting three different CI with the same magnitude, with only 6 hours 
between disruptions is not very likely. This gives the impression that the constructed worst-
case scenario itself is not realistic, but it does not influence whether the thesis model is a good 
representation for cascading effects or not. This shows that the thesis model can be used for 
multiple disruptions as well as single disruptions, but the multiple disruptions should be 
constructed with more data to support variables such as magnitude, disruption time and 
length. 
 
                                                 
2 Canzani E. 2018. System dynamics modelling. E-mail correspondence 21.01.2018. (Farstad 
T.) 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis is an attempt at replicating Canzani’s model which has been done to a certain 
degree successfully, and to develop a new model which is more appropriate to represent 
cascading effects on CI. The thesis has answered the problem statements and tested the 
hypothesis outlined in the introduction. The study and replication of Canzani’s model showed 
her proposed model could be improved which answered the first problem statement. The 
development of the thesis model was a success and the model passed all applicable tests that 
serve to support it as a strong model. The SIRS-model is not an applicable approach to 
modelling cascading effects from disruptions. This hypothesis was tested by developing a 
new model that is found to be more appropriate in simulating cascading effects. The limited 
results from the online survey results differ significantly from Laugé’s results (2014) which 
answers the second problem statement. The survey results were not representative of 
cascading effects in Norway however. This is due to the lack of responses and it can be 
considered a future work to obtain more data which can be added to further simulations. 
Another branch of future work is the further development of worst-case scenarios with system 
dynamics modelling which can lead to important results that can be used by decision makers 
and experts in preparing for possible disasters. It is acknowledged that the thesis model is a 
simplified representation of a system containing critical infrastructure relationships and 
interdependencies. There are limitations in the thesis model regarding input and output which 
can and should be assessed by the individual scenario regarding how effective the model 
simulations are. The thesis model and results will also be discussed in (Farstad, et al. 2018) 
and have been submitted to the IT in Disaster Risk Reduction (ITDDR2018) conference, and 
an extended second article by the same authors will be submitted to Hawaii International 
Conference of System Sciences (HICSS 2019). 
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Appendix A – Critical Infrastructure survey 
A survey for expressing the performance in critical infrastructures (CI) after suffering from 
cascading effects as concequence of disruption in one of the CI's, where the disruption lasts 
for three different time intervals.  
We are in this survey considering the following five critical infrastructures (CIs):  Energy,  
ICT, Water, Financial and Transport. The performance level of each CI is measured as a 
percentage:  100% means that a CI is running at normal operational level; 50% means it is 
running at half of the normal operational level and so on. The values you provide will be 
converted into this percentile system and will be used in a system dynamics model to assess 
the behaviour of networked Critical Infrastructures.  
The estimated time to finish the survey is 10 minutes. 
For questions, please contact me via e-mail: Tor-Edin Farstad -  toredf13@student.uia.no 
 
Survey Question 1 
Assume that the Energy CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the ICT CI will perform at eighty percent of 
its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for ICT, and similarly for the other 
CIs. 
ICT ____________________________   Water ___________________________
Financial ________________________   Transport ________________________   
 
Survey Question 2 
Assume that the ICT CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Water CI will perform at eighty percent of 
its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for Water, and similarly for the 
other CIs. 
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Energy  _________________________   Water ___________________________
Financial ________________________   Transport ________________________
 
Survey Question 3 
Assume that the Water CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Financial CI will perform at eighty 
percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for Financial, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   ICT  ____________________________ 
Financial ________________________   Transport ________________________ 
 
Survey Question 4 
Assume that the Financial CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Transport CI will perform at 
eighty percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for Transport, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Transport ________________________ 
Survey Question 5 
Assume that the Transport CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 2 hours. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the ICT CI will perform at 
eighty percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 80 in the field for ICT, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
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Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Financial  ________________________ 
 
In this part of the survey we wish to assess the cascading effects when the length of the 
disruption is 24 hours. 
Survey Question 6 
Assume that the Energy CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 24 hours. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the ICT CI will perform at forty 
percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 40 in the field for ICT, and similarly 
for the other CIs. 
ICT  ____________________________   
Water ___________________________  
Financial   ________________________   
Transport  ________________________   
Survey Question 7 
Assume that the ICT CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 24 hours. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect.E.g., if you believe that the Energy CI will perform at forty percent of 
its normal operational level, then you enter 40 in the field for Energy, and similarly for the 
other CIs. 
Energy   _________________________   
Water ___________________________  
Financial   ________________________   
Transport  ________________________  
 
 
 
   
48 
 
Survey Question 8 
Assume that the Water CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 24 hours. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Financial CI will perform at forty percent 
of its normal operational level, then you enter 40 in the field for Financial, and similarly for 
the other CIs. 
Energy   _________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Financial  ________________________   
Transport ________________________
Survey Question 9 
Assume that the Financial CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 24 hours. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Transport CI will perform at 
forty percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 40 in the field for Transport, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT   ____________________________   
Transport  ________________________ 
Survey Question 10 
Assume that the Transport CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 24 hours. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Water CI will perform at 
forty percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 40 in the field for Water, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Financial  ________________________ 
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In this part of the survey we wish to assess the cascading effects when the length of the 
disruption is 7 days. 
Survey Question 11 
Assume that the Energy CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 7 days. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Water CI will perform at ten percent of its 
normal operational level, then you enter 10 in the field for Water, and similarly for the other 
CIs. 
ICT  ____________________________   
Water ___________________________  
Financial   ________________________   
Transport  ________________________   
Survey Question 12 
Assume that the ICT CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 7 days. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Energy CI will perform at ten percent of 
its normal operational level, then you enter 10 in the field for Energy, and similarly for the 
other CIs. 
Energy   _________________________   
Water ___________________________  
Financial   ________________________   
Transport  ________________________  
Survey Question 13 
Assume that the Water CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 7 days. Such 
disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the other 
CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as consequence 
of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Financial CI will perform at ten percent of 
its normal operational level, then you enter 10 in the field for Financial, and similarly for the 
other CIs. 
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Energy   _________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Financial  ________________________   
Transport ________________________  
Survey Question 14 
 Assume that the Financial CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 7 days. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the Transport CI will perform at 
ten percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 10 in the field for Transport, and 
similarly for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT   ____________________________   
Transport  ________________________ 
Survey Question 15 
Assume that the Transport CI gets fully disrupted (i.e., 0% performance level) for 7 days. 
Such disruption will result in cascading effects, that is, to impact the performance level of the 
other CIs. Please provide your estimate for the performance level of the other CIs as 
consequence of the cascading effect. E.g., if you believe that the ICT CI will perform at ten 
percent of its normal operational level, then you enter 10 in the field for ICT, and similarly 
for the other CIs. 
Energy  _________________________   
Water  __________________________   
ICT  ____________________________   
Financial  ________________________ 
 
Survey Question 16 
Do you have any other comments about the survey? (Optional) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix B – Results from extreme condition tests 
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Appendix C – Results from multivariate method of testing the 
average repair and restore time for all CI 
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Appendix D – Results from multivariate sensitivity tests of 
average demand variable for Financial, ICT, Energy and 
Transport CI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing avg. demand
50.0% 75.0% 95.0% 100.0%
Running Operations Financial
100
97
94
91
88
85
82
79
76
73
70
0 33.6 67.2 100.8 134.4 168 201.6 235.2 268.8 302.4 336
Time (Hour)
Testing avg. demand
50.0% 75.0% 95.0% 100.0%
Running Operations ICT
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 33.6 67.2 100.8 134.4 168 201.6 235.2 268.8 302.4 336
Time (Hour)
   
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing avg. demand
50.0% 75.0% 95.0% 100.0%
Running Operations Energy
100
97
94
91
88
85
82
79
76
73
70
0 33.6 67.2 100.8 134.4 168 201.6 235.2 268.8 302.4 336
Time (Hour)
Testing avg. demand
50.0% 75.0% 95.0% 100.0%
Running Operations Transport
100
97
94
91
88
85
82
79
76
73
70
0 33.6 67.2 100.8 134.4 168 201.6 235.2 268.8 302.4 336
Time (Hour)
   
57 
 
Appendix E – Results from multivariate testing of eij-parameters 
for all CI 
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Appendix F – Results from Canzani’s 3 scenarios, simulated with 
the replicated model, shown pairwise. 
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Appendix G – Results from all simulated disruptions with eij-
parameters from the online survey, sorted pairwise by disruption 
length and magnitude 
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Appendix H – Results from the single disruption scenario 
simulations with correct eij-parameters, pairwise according to 
disruption length and magnitude 
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Appendix I – Replicated model 
Average Demand Energy = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
Average Demand Financial = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI performs on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to render their demand to each other. 
Average demand ICT = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI performs on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to render their demand to each other. 
Average demand Transport = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI performs on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to render their demand to each other. 
Average demand Water = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI performs on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to render their demand to each other. 
Average repair time Financial = 33 
Units: Hour 
The average time it takes to repair the Financial CI, measured in hours. The value was given 
by Canzani herself.¨ 
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Average repair time Transport = 33 
Units: Hour 
The average time it takes to repair the Energy CI, measured in hours. The value was given by 
Canzani herself. 
Average repair time Water = 33 
Units: Hour 
The average time it takes to repair the Water CI, measured in hours. The value was given by 
Canzani herself. 
Average time to repair Energy = 33 
Units: Hour 
The average time it takes to repair the Energy CI, measured in hours. The value was given by 
Canzani herself. 
Average time to repair ICT = 33 
Units: Hour 
The average time it takes to repair the ICT CI, measured in hours. The value was given by 
Canzani herself. 
Average unit time to restore Energy = 14 
Units: Hour 
The return to service average time unit, measure in hours. Provided by Canzani. 
 
Average unit time to restore Financial = 14 
Units: Hour 
The return to service average time unit, measure in hours. Provided by Canzani. 
 
Average unit time to restore ICT = 14 
Units: Hour 
The return to service average time unit, measure in hours. Provided by Canzani. 
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Average unit time to restore Transport = 14 
Units: Hour 
The return to service average time unit, measure in hours. Provided by Canzani. 
Average Unit time to restore Water = 14 
Units: Hour 
The return to service average time unit, measure in hours. Provided by Canzani. 
 
Breakdown rate Energy= 
IF THEN ELSE (Running Operations Energy > 0, Disruption Energy + ( Running Operations 
Energy / Max Capability Energy ) * ( ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Energy,ICT] * ( 1 - Service 
provided ICT ) ) + ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Energy,Water ]* ( 1 - Service provided Water ) ) 
+ ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Energy,Financial] * ( 1 - Service provided Financial ) ) + ( effect 
on CI1 from CI2[Energy,Transport] * ( 1 - Service provided Transport ) ) ) / 5, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations with and added specific 
Disruption, to simulate multiple disruption-scenarios. The rate is also influenced by cascading 
effects from the other CI's. The If then else clause prevents the level from reaching a negative 
value. The equation uses the respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
Breakdown rate Financial= 
IF THEN ELSE (Running Operations Financial > 0, ( Running Operations Financial / Max 
Capacity Financial ) * ( ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Financial,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided 
Energy) ) + ( effect on CI1 from CI2[FinancialICT] * ( 1 - Service provided ICT ) ) + ( effect 
on CI1 from CI2[Financial,Water] * ( 1 - Service provided Water) ) + ( effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Financial,Transport] * ( 1 - Service provided Transport) ) ) / 5, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations with and added specific 
Disruption, to simulate multiple disruption-scenarios. The rate is influenced by cascading 
effects from the other CI's. The If then else clause prevents the level from reaching a negative 
value. The equation uses the respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
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Breakdown rate ICT= 
IF THEN ELSE ( Running Operations ICT > 0, Disruption ICT + ( Running Operations ICT/ 
Max capability ICT) * ( ( effect on CI1 from CI2[ICT,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided 
Energy ) ) + ( effect on CI1 from CI2[ICT,Water] * ( 1 - Service provided Water ) ) + ( effect 
on CI1 from CI2[ICT,Financial] * ( 1 - Service provided Financial) ) + ( effect on CI1 from 
CI2[ICT,Transport] * ( 1 - Service provided Transport) ) ) / 5, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations with an added specific 
Disruption. The rate is influenced by cascading effects from the other CI's. The If then else 
clause prevents the level from reaching a negative value. The equation uses the respective 
e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
Breakdown rate Transport= 
IF THEN ELSE ( Running Operations Transport > 0, ( Running Operations Transport/ Max 
capacity Transport) * ( ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Transport,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided 
Energy) ) + ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Transport,ICT] * ( 1 - Service provided ICT ) ) + ( 
effect on CI1 from CI2[Transport,Water] * ( 1 - Service provided Water) ) + ( effect on CI1 
from CI2[Transport,Financial] * ( 1 - Service provided Financial) ) ) / 5, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations with and added specific 
Disruption, to simulate multiple disruption-scenarios. The rate is influenced by cascading 
effects from the other CI's. The If then else clause prevents the level from reaching a negative 
value. The equation uses the respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
Breakdown rate Water= 
IF THEN ELSE ( Running Operations Water > 0, ( Running Operations Water / Max 
Capability Water ) * ( ( effect on CI1 from CI2[Water,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided 
Energy) ) + (effect on CI1 from CI2[Water,ICT] * (1 - Service provided ICT ) ) + ( effect on 
CI1 from CI2[Water,Financial] * ( 1 - Service provided Financial) ) + ( effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Water,Transport]* ( 1 - Service provided Transport) ) ) / 5, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations with and added specific 
Disruption, to simulate multiple disruption-scenarios. The rate is influenced by cascading 
effects from the other CI's. The If then else clause prevents the level from reaching a negative 
value. The equation uses the respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
 
 
   
80 
 
CI1: 
 Energy, ICT, Water, Financial, Transport 
The subset of the elements in the two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the 
values in the e(ij)-table, corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The populated 
values range from 0 to 5. 
CI2: 
 Energy, ICT, Water, Financial, Transport 
The elements in the two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the values in the e(ij)-
table, corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The populated values range from 0 
to 5. 
 
Current Capability Energy = Running Operations Energy / Max Capability Energy 
Units: 1 
The current capability of the Energy CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Energy CI. 
 
Current Capability ICT = Running Operations ICT / Max capability ICT 
Units: Dmnl 
The current capability of the ICT CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the ICT CI. 
 
Current capability Water = Running Operations Water / Max Capability Water 
Units: 1 
The current capability of the Water CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Water CI. 
 
Current Capacity Financial = Running Operations Financial / Max Capacity Financial 
Units: 1 
The current capability of the Financial CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Financial CI. 
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Current capacity Transport = Running Operations Transport / Max capacity Transport 
Units: 1 
The current capability of the Transport CI, defined as the ratio between the running 
operations stock and the maximum capacity of the Transport CI. 
 
 
Disruption duration = 24 
Units: Hour 
The duration of the disruption measured in hours. 
 
Disruption duration Energy = 36 
Units: Hour 
The duration of the pulse disruption measured in hours. 
 
Disruption Energy = Disruption Magnitude Energy * PULSE ( Disruption Time Energy, 
Disruption duration Energy ) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The disruptive function d(t), implemented by using the PULSE  function to simulate 
disruptive behaviour at a point in time t with a duration T, multiplied by the Disruption 
magnitude. 
 
Disruption ICT = PULSE ( Disruption Time , Disruption duration ) * Disruption Magnitude 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The disruptive function d(t), implemented by using the PULSE function to simulate 
disruptive behaviour at a point in time t with a duration T, multiplied by the Disruption 
magnitude. 
 
Disruption Magnitude=2 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The dimensionless magnitude of the disruption, ranging from 0 (no disruption), to 10 
(complete breakdown). 
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Disruption Magnitude Energy = 0 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The dimensionless magnitude of the disruption, ranging from 0 (no disruption), to 10 
(complete breakdown). 
 
Disruption Time = 24 
Units: Hour 
The time during the simulation in which the disruption occurs. 
 
Disruption Time Energy = 96 
Units: Hour 
The time of the simulation in which the Energy CI disruption occurs. 
 
 
Down Operations Energy = INTEG( Breakdown rate Energy - Repair rate Energy, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state, where the Energy CI has a lack of output in production. Depending on the 
breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made that at t=0 the 
level is empty. 
 
Down Operations Financial = INTEG( Breakdown rate Financial - Repair rate Financial, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state, where the Financial CI has a lack of output in production. Depending on the 
breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made that at t=0 the 
level is empty. 
 
Down Operations ICT = INTEG( Breakdown rate ICT - Repair rate ICT , 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state, where the ICT CI has a lack of output in production. Depending on the 
breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made that at t=0 the 
level is empty. 
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Down Operations Transport = INTEG( Breakdown rate Transport - Repair rate Transport, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state, where the Transport CI has a lack of output in production. Depending on the 
breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors.The assumption is made that at t=0 the level 
is empty. 
 
Down Operations Water = INTEG( Breakdown rate Water - Repair rate water , 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state, where the Water CI has a lack of output in production. Depending on the 
breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made that at t=0 the 
level is empty. 
 
effect on CI1 from CI2[CI1,CI2]= 
 0, 2.67, 0.83, 0.17, 1.17; 
 0.86, 0, 0.57, 0.71, 1; 
 1.33, 1, 0, 0, 0; 
 2.67, 2.33, 0, 0, 1;  
 2.4, 2.4, 0.2, 0.6, 0; 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the values in the e(ij)-table, 
corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The values can range from 0 to 5 and are 
taken from Canzani’s (2016, p. 7)  
 
FINAL TIME = 336 
Units: Hour 
The final time for the simulation. 
 
INITIAL TIME = 0 
Units: Hour 
The initial time for the simulation. 
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Max Capability Energy = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Energy CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max capability ICT = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the ICT CI measured in the number of operations it can perform. 
0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max Capability Water = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Water CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max Capacity Financial = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Financial CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max capacity Transport = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Transport CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Operations recovered ICT = INTEG( Repair rate ICT - Return to service ICT ,0) 
Units: Operations 
The recovering phase in which the infrastructure attempts to return to previous service levels. 
 
Recovering Operations Energy = INTEG( Repair rate Energy - Return to service Energy, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The recovering phase in which the infrastructure attempts to return to previous service levels. 
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Recovering Operations Financial = INTEG( Repair rate Financial - Return to service 
Financial, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The recovering phase in which the infrastructure attempts to return to previous service levels. 
 
Recovering Operations Transport = INTEG( Repair rate Transport - Return to service 
Transport, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The recovering phase in which the infrastructure attempts to return to previous service levels. 
 
Recovering Operations Water = INTEG( Repair rate water - Return to service Water, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The recovering phase in which the infrastructure attempts to return to previous service levels. 
 
Repair rate Energy = Down Operations Energy / Average time to repair Energy 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Energy CI is repaired and enters the recovery state. 
 
Repair rate Financial = Down Operations Financial / Average repair time Financial 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Financial CI is repaired and enters the recovery state. 
 
Repair rate ICT = Down Operations ICT / Average time to repair ICT 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the ICT CI is repaired and enters the recovery state. 
 
Repair rate Transport = Down Operations Transport / Average repair time Transport 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Transport CI is repaired and enters the recovery state. 
 
 
   
86 
 
Repair rate water = Down Operations Water / Average repair time Water 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Water CI is repaired and enters the recovery state. 
 
Return to service Energy = Recovering Operations Energy / Average unit time to restore 
Energy 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Energy CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to service Financial = Recovering Operations Financial / Average unit time to restore 
Financial 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Financial CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to service ICT = Operations recovered ICT / Average unit time to restore ICT 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the ICT CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to service Transport = Recovering Operations Transport / Average unit time to restore 
Transport 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Transport CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to service Water = Recovering Operations Water / Average Unit time to restore Water 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Water CI returns to full service. 
 
Running Operations Energy = INTEG( - Breakdown rate Energy + Return to service Energy, 
100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Energy CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
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Running Operations Financial = INTEG( Return to service Financial - Breakdown rate 
Financial, 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Financial CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations ICT = INTEG( Return to service ICT - Breakdown rate ICT , 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the ICT CI. It is assumed that the 
CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations Transport = INTEG( Return to service Transport - Breakdown rate 
Transport, 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Transport CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations Water = INTEG( - Breakdown rate Water + Return to service Water, 
100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Water CI. It is assumed that the 
CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
SAVEPER = TIME STEP 
Units: Hour [0,?] 
The frequency with which output is stored. 
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Service Provided Energy= 
 IF THEN ELSE ( Current Capability Energy >= Average Demand Energy , 1,Current 
Capability Energy / Average Demand Energy ) 
Units: 1 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Energy CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
Service provided Financial = IF THEN ELSE ( Current Capacity Financial >= Average 
Demand Financial , 1, Current Capacity Financial / Average Demand Financial ) 
Units: 1 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Financial CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
Service provided ICT = IF THEN ELSE ( Current Capability ICT >= Average demand ICT, 
1, Current Capability ICT / Average demand ICT ) 
Units: 1 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the ICT CI. Measured 
between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service provided. 
 
Service provided Transport = IF THEN ELSE ( Current capacity Transport >= Average 
demand Transport, 1, Current capacity Transport / Average demand Transport ) 
Units: 1 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Transport CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
Service provided Water = IF THEN ELSE ( Current capability Water >= Average demand 
Water, 1, Current capability Water / Average demand Water ) 
Units: 1 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the ICT CI. Measured 
between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service provided. 
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TIME STEP = 0.0078125 
Units: Hour [0,?] 
The time step for the simulation. 
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Appendix J – Thesis model 
 
Average Demand Energy = 0.9 
Units: Dimensionless  
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
  
Average Demand Financial = 0.9 
Units: Dimensionless 
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
 
Average Demand ICT=0.9 
Units: Dimensionless 
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
 
Average Demand Transport = 0.9 
Units: Dmnl 
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
 
Average Demand Water = 0.9 
Units: Dimensionless 
An assumption is made that all CI perform on average at 90 percent of full capacity at any 
given time to supply their demand to each other. 
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Average Repair and Restore Time Energy=47 
Units: Hours 
The sum of the total average repair and restore time variables from Canzanis article, 
measured in hours. 
 
Average Repair and Restore Time Financial=47 
Units: Hours 
The sum of the total average repair and restore time variables from Canzanis article, 
measured in hours. 
 
Average Repair and Restore Time ICT=47 
Units: Hours 
The sum of the total average repair and restore time variables from Canzanis article, 
measured in hours. 
 
Average Repair and Restore Time Transport=47 
Units: Hours 
The sum of the average repair and restore time variables from Canzanis article, measured in 
hours. 
Average Repair and Restore Time Water=47 
Units: Hours 
The sum of the total average repair and restore time variables from Canzanis article, 
measured in hours. 
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Breakdown Rate Energy= 
IF THEN ELSE( Running Operations Energy>0 :AND: Max Capability Energy<>0, 
MIN(Unit normalization*( Running Operations Energy / Max Capability Energy ) * (( ( 
Effect on CI1 from CI2[Energy,ICT] * ( 1 -Service Provided ICT ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Energy,Water]* ( 1 - Service Provided Water ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Energy,Financial] * ( 1 - Service Provided Financial) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Energy,Transport] * ( 1 - Service Provided Transport ) ) ) / 5), Running Operations 
Energy/TIME STEP),0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations. The rate is affected by 
cascading effects from the other CI's (Service Provided). The IF THEN ELSE with the nested 
MIN-function ensures the Running operations never goes below zero. The equation uses the 
respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
 
Breakdown Rate Financial= 
IF THEN ELSE(Running Operations Financial>0 :AND: Max Capability Financial <>0, 
MIN(Unit normalization*( Running Operations Financial / Max Capability Financial) * ( ( ( 
Effect on CI1 from CI2[Financial,Energy]* ( 1 - Service Provided Energy) ) + ( Effect on CI1 
from CI2[Financial,ICT]* ( 1 - Service Provided ICT ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Financial,Water] * ( 1 - Service Provided Water) ) + (Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Financial,Transport] * ( 1 - Service Provided Transport) ) ) / 5), Running Operations 
Financial/TIME STEP),0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations. The rate is affected by 
cascading effects from the other CI's (Service Provided). The IF THEN ELSE with the nested 
MIN-function ensures the Running operations never goes below zero. The equation uses the 
respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
 
Breakdown Rate ICT= 
IF THEN ELSE(Running Operations ICT>0 :AND: Max Capability ICT <>0, 
MIN(Disruption +Unit normalization*( Running Operations ICT / Max Capability ICT) * ( ( ( 
Effect on CI1 from CI2[ICT,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided Energy ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 
from CI2[ICT,Water]* ( 1 - Service Provided Water ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[ICT,Financial] * ( 1 - Service Provided Financial) ) + (Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[ICT,Transport]* ( 1 - Service Provided Transport ) ) ) / 5),Running Operations 
ICT/TIME STEP),0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
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The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations. The rate is affected by 
cascading effects from the other CI's (Service Provided). The IF THEN ELSE with the nested 
MIN-function ensures the Running operations never goes below zero. The equation uses the 
respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
 
Breakdown Rate Transport= 
IF THEN ELSE(Running Operations Transport>0 :AND: Max Capability<>0, MIN(Unit 
normalization*( Running Operations Transport / Max Capability Transport ) * ( ( ( Effect on 
CI1 from CI2[Transport,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided Energy ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Transport,ICT] * ( 1 - Service Provided ICT ) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Transport,Water] * ( 1 - Service Provided Water) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Transport,Financial] * ( 1 - Service Provided Financial) ) )  / 5), Running Operations 
Transport/TIME STEP),0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations. The rate is affected by 
cascading effects from the other CI's (Service Provided). The IF THEN ELSE with the nested 
MIN-function ensures the Running operations never goes below zero. The equation uses the 
respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
 
Breakdown Rate Water= 
IF THEN ELSE(Running Operations Water>0 :AND: Max Capability Water<>0, MIN(Unit 
normalization*( Running Operations Water / Max Capability Water )* ( ( ( Effect on CI1 
from CI2[Water,Energy] * ( 1 - Service Provided Energy) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from 
CI2[Water,ICT] * ( 1 - Service Provided ICT ) )+ ( Effect on CI1 from CI2[Water,Financial] 
* ( 1 - Service Provided Financial) ) + ( Effect on CI1 from CI2[Water,Transport] * ( 1 - 
Service Provided Transport) ) ) / 5), Running Operations Water/TIME STEP),0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The breakdown rate from running operations to down operations. The rate is affected by 
cascading effects from the other CI's (Service Provided). The IF THEN ELSE with the nested 
MIN-function ensures the Running operations never goes below zero. The equation uses the 
respective e(ij) values from the subscript array. 
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CI1: 
 Energy, ICT, Water, Financial, Transport 
The subset of the elements in the two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the 
values in the e(ij)-table, corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The populated 
values range from 0 to 5, depending on which table they are collected from, either Lauge or 
the online survey. 
 
CI2: 
 Energy, ICT, Water, Financial, Transport 
The elements in the two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the values in the e(ij)-
table, corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The populated values range from 0 
to 5, depending on which table they are collected from, either Lauge or the online survey. 
 
Current Capability Energy= 
IF THEN ELSE (Max Capability Energy > 0, Running Operations Energy / Max Capability 
Energy, 0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The current capability of the Energy CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Energy CI. 
 
Current Capability Financial = 
IF THEN ELSE (Max Capability Financial > 0, Running Operations Financial / Max 
Capability Financial, 0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The current capability of the Financial CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Financial CI. 
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Current Capability ICT =  
IF THEN ELSE (Max Capability ICT > 0, Running Operations ICT / Max Capability ICT, 0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The current capability of the ICT CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the ICT CI. 
 
Current Capability Transport = 
IF THEN ELSE (Max Capability Transport > 0, Running Operations Transport / Max 
Capability Transport, 0) 
Units: Dmnl 
The current capability of the Transport CI, defined as the ratio between the running 
operations stock and the maximum capacity of the Transport CI. 
 
Current Capability Water =  
IF THEN ELSE (Max Capability Water> 0, Running Operations Water / Max Capability 
Water 
Units: Dimensionless 
The current capability of the Water CI, defined as the ratio between the running operations 
stock and the maximum capacity of the Water CI. 
 
Disruption = PULSE (Disruption Time, Disruption Duration) * Disruption Magnitude 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The disruptive function d(t), implemented by using the PULSE function to simulate 
disruptive behaviour at a point in time t with a duration T, multiplied by the Disruption 
magnitude. 
 
Disruption Duration = 24 
Units: Hours 
The duration of the disruption. 
 
Disruption Magnitude=9 
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Units: Operations/Hour 
The dimensionless magnitude of the disruption, ranging from 0 (no disruption), to 10 
(complete breakdown). 
 
Disruption Time=21 
Units: Hours 
The time during the simulation in which the disruption occurs. 
 
Down Operations Energy = INTEG (Breakdown Rate Energy - Return to Service Energy, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state of the Energy CI, where the Energy CI has a lack of output in production, 
depending on the breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made 
that at t=0 the level is empty. 
 
Down Operations Financial = INTEG (Breakdown Rate Financial - Return to Service 
Financial, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state of the Financial CI, where the Financial CI has a lack of output in production, 
depending on the breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made 
that at t=0 the level is empty. 
 
Down Operations ICT = INTEG (Breakdown Rate ICT - Return to Service ICT, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state of the ICT CI, where the ICT CI has a lack of output in production, 
depending on the breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made 
that at t=0 the level is empty. 
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Down Operations Transport = INTEG (Breakdown Rate Transport - Return to Service 
Transport, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state of the Transport CI, where the Transport CI has a lack of output in 
production, depending on the breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The 
assumption is made that at t=0 the level is empty. 
 
Down Operations Water = INTEG (Breakdown Rate Water - Return to Service Water, 0) 
Units: Operations 
The down-state of the Water CI, where the Water CI has a lack of output in production, 
depending on the breakdown rate, disruption and cascading factors. The assumption is made 
that at t=0 the level is empty. 
 
Effect on CI1 from CI2[CI1,CI2]= 
 0, 4.67, 3.43, 2.43, 3;  
 4.57, 0, 3.5, 3, 3.83; 
 4.57, 3.67, 0, 2, 3.67; 
 4.67, 4.67, 1, 0, 3.67; 
 4.2, 4.6, 2.6, 2.2, 0; 
Units: Dmnl 
The two-dimensional subscript array which contains all the values in the e(ij)-table, 
corresponding to the effect each CI has on the other. The populated values range from 0 to 5, 
depending on which table they are collected from, either Lauge or the online survey. 
FINAL TIME  = 168 
Units: Hour 
The final time for the simulation. 
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INITIAL TIME  = 0 
Units: Hour 
The initial time for the simulation. 
 
Max Capability Energy = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Energy CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max Capability Financial = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Financial CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max Capability ICT = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the ICT CI measured in the number of operations it can perform. 
0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Max Capability Transport=100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Transport CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
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Max Capability Water = 100 
Units: Operations 
The maximum capability of the Water CI measured in the number of operations it can 
perform. 0 being no operations at all and 100 representing full performance. 
 
Return to Service Energy = IF THEN ELSE (Average Repair and Restore Time Energy 
>0, Down Operations Energy / Average Repair and Restore Time Energy, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Energy CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to Service Financial = IF THEN ELSE (Average Repair and Restore Time Financial 
>0, Down Operations Financial / Average Repair and Restore Time Financial, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Financial CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to Service ICT = IF THEN ELSE (Average Repair and Restore Time ICT>0,  
Down Operations ICT / Average Repair and Restore Time ICT, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the ICT CI returns to full service. 
 
Return to Service Transport = IF THEN ELSE (Average Repair and Restore Time 
Transport>0, Down Operations Transport / Average Repair and Restore Time Transport, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Transport CI returns to full service. 
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Return to Service Water = IF THEN ELSE (Average Repair and Restore Time Water>0, 
Down Operations Water / Average Repair and Restore Time Water, 0) 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The rate at which the Water CI returns to full service. 
 
Running Operations Energy= INTEG (Return to Service Energy - Breakdown Rate 
Energy,100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Energy CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations Financial = INTEG (Return to Service Financial - Breakdown Rate 
Financial, 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Financial CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations ICT = INTEG (Return to Service ICT - Breakdown Rate ICT , 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the ICT CI. It is assumed that the 
CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
Running Operations Transport = INTEG (Return to Service Transport - Breakdown Rate 
Transport, 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Transport CI. It is assumed that 
the CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
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Running Operations Water = INTEG (Return to Service Water - Breakdown Rate Water, 100) 
Units: Operations 
Running operations represents the day-to-day functions of the Water CI. It is assumed that the 
CI operates at 100% capacity at time t=0. 
 
SAVEPER  = TIME STEP 
Units: Hour [0,?] 
The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
Service Provided Energy = IF THEN ELSE (Current Capability Energy >= Average Demand 
Energy, 1, Current Capability Energy / Average Demand Energy) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Energy CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
Service Provided Financial= 
IF THEN ELSE (Current Capability Financial >= Average Demand Financial, 1, Current 
Capability Financial / Average Demand Financial) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Financial CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
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Service Provided ICT =IF THEN ELSE (Current Capability ICT >= Average Demand ICT, 1, 
Current Capability ICT / Average Demand ICT) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the ICT CI. Measured 
between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service provided. 
 
Service Provided Transport=IF THEN ELSE (Current Capability Transport >= Average 
Demand Transport, 1, Current Capability Transport / Average Demand Transport) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Transport CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
Service Provided Water=IF THEN ELSE (Current Capability Water >= Average Demand 
Water, 1, Current Capability Water / Average Demand Water) 
Units: Dimensionless 
The control variable which assesses over time the service provided by the Water CI. 
Measured between 0 and 1. 0 Being no service provided and 1 representing full service 
provided. 
 
TIME STEP  = 0.0625 
Units: Hour [0,?] 
The time step for the simulation. 
 
Unit normalization=1 
Units: Operations/Hour 
The normalizing factor which ensures the units for the e(ij)-factors are coherently 
operations/hour. 
 
